Proposal: List IV/13 Medieval German - some minor changes
Author: Duncan Head
Synopsis: This is famously one of the most complex and difficult
lists in all four books. Many would agree that it needs completely re-
writing and re-structuring. At this stage I only list some minor
points that need to be fixed in any re-written German list(s).
The following points are covered here:
1 What allied generals must command
2 Konradin's Spanish allies
3 Fortified camps
4 Dismounting knights
1 What allied generals must command
One problem with the list is that most generals available are allies;
the combination of the range of troops available to different allies
plus the normal rule that internal ally-generals must command at
least a quarter of the minimum of each compulsory type results in
several troop-types having to be divided between commands in a way
that often produces errors in compiling lists, can produce clumsy
armies, and is hard to justify historically. Unless and until the
list is rewritten to reduce this problem, a suggested solution would
be to add to the notes the following:
"Allied generals are not obliged to command normally compulsory
troops of an origin different to the general's own."
2 Konradin's Spanish allies
The Spanish general available to Konradin's army in Italy in 1268
(Henry of Castile) is unindented. This was probably a mistake, as it
implies he was "of the same or a closely related nationality" – but
neither are Castilians closely related to Germans, nor was Henry
personally closely related to Konradin. Further, the rules oblige an
unindented Spanish general to command at least a quarter of other
compulsory types – in this case German feudal knights, Italian
knights, and mercenary knights if any are used. In fact Henry's
division at Tagliacozzo contained his own Spaniards and some Italian
men-at-arms, but no Germans (Oman v.I p.509; Runciman pp.127-8).
Command of the Italians should also be clarified. At Tagliacozzo
there were three "battles":
- The van under Henry of Castile with the Spanish and some Italians
- The second under Galvano Lancia and the Count of Parma with
Italians and a few Germans
- The reserve under the C-in-c Konradin himself with the bulk of the
Germans
Treating the Italians (who were local Ghibelline (pro-Hohenstaufen)
nobles, not mercenaries) as "feudal" troops will allow the correct
results, at least if this organisation is followed, with both the
Spanish general and any "feudal ally-general" (Lancia) having to
command some Italians.
A suggested solution is:
1 Indent the Spanish general and Spanish troops;
2 Add to the notes "The Spanish general in Konradin's army must
command all Spanish troops, may command Italians, but may not command
other troops. Treat the Italian Kn as feudal for command purposes."
References:
Sir Charles Oman, "A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages"
(Methuen 1924, reprint Greenhill 1991)
Sir Steven Runciman, "The Sicilian Vespers" (Penguin, 1958)
3 Fortified camps and other wagon laagers
The list makes no explicit provision for fortified camps. However
these were clearly used throughout the period:
1. The Emperor Henry V is described as retiring at night into
a "wagenburg" (the translator's rendering) after being worsted by
the Cologne militia in a skirmish in 1114 – see the "Greater Annals
of Cologne" at
http://www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/SOURCES/cologne.htm
2. The future Emperor Charles IV, describing campaigns with his
father John of Luxemburg, King of Bohemia, in Italy in 1332, twice
mentions fortifying their camp – see
http://www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/SOURCES/charles.htm . He does
not say how the camps were fortified – perhaps with ditches and
earthwork ramparts as by Italian armies, but perhaps with wagons.
3. An account of the Margrave of Brandenburg's army in 1462
describes a wagenburg of 1,000 wagons, which are certainly being
used as camp fortifications at night – with gates, tents, and sentry-
parties – whatever their function may have been in battle
(Christopher Gravett, German Medieval Armies 1300–1500 (Osprey 1985)
pp.21-22).
4. About 1480, the "Mittelalterliche Hausbuch" shows an Imperial
camp fortified by two rings of wagons, the outer of wheeled pavise-
style gun-wagons and the inner ring of ordinary supply wagons -
http://www.humanist.de/rome/housebook/hausbu3.jpg
What the published list does allow is city militia wagon-laagers,
after 1320, described as a wagon-laager but costed (at 2AP) not as
camp fortifications but as fieldworks. I have so far found no
supporting evidence for wagons being used as a field fortification,
other than for a camp, until after Hussite influence sets in. Since
this line survives from version 1 of the list, compiled for an
earlier version of the rules where the distinction between camp and
other fortifications was not made, it may be that it was originally
meant for camps but was overlooked in the revision. Indeed that 12
elements' frontage is allowed, more or less the standard figure for
camp fortifications in the published lists, does reinforce the idea
that the laager was originally meant for a camp. While 12 elements
may not be enough to fortify a camp in all circumstances, it does
appear to be chosen as the amount necessary to protect the maximum
eight baggage elements, arranged two deep on the baseline, with
space for defenders on three sides.
I therefore suggest replacing –
Only after 1320 AD:
City wagon laager – TF @ 2AP 0-12
with -
Wagon laager to fortify camp – TF @ 1AP 0-12
- with no date or usage restrictions. The examples cited above are
all for Imperial or "feudal" armies; but I see no reason to assume
that wagon-camps could not be used by other German forces.
The use of wagons as field-fortifications is another question. As I
said I have come across no evidence before the Hussite period, but
afterwards wagon-forts were clearly used for more than just camps.
At Pfeddersheim in 1460 both sides deployed their infantry and
artillery behind wagon-laagers – the allied forces of the Count of
Leiningen, the Archbishop of Mainz and others deployed the infantry
of an 8,000-man army, plus at least 43 artillery pieces, in a circle
of allegedly 1,000 wagons. (This seems too many: Hussite and
Austrian practice required 20 men to a wagon, so assuming this army
had at least 1,000 horse, perhaps more, only 350 wagons at most
would be expected for 7,000 or fewer foot.) The opposing forces of
Friedrich of the Palatinate also deployed infantry and artillery
behind a wagenburg; the modern account I found this in speaks
inevitably of the wagenburg being a Hussite tactic. However the
Palatine infantry left it to fight, storming the allied wagenburg
once the Palatine cavalry had broken their opponents - which DBM/MM
WWg cannot do. So should we class these wagons as TF or as WWg? TF
certainly seems better for this example, and it may well be that the
Germans were rarely able to reproduce the more flexible offensive
use of the wagons sometimes seen from the Hussites. I would suggest:
Only after 1426 AD:
Wagon laager as field-fortification – TF @ 2AP 0-24
Non-camp TF cannot be used with WWg (O)
- to prevent the use of the same wagons in two roles. The double
ring of wagons of "Mittelalterliche Hausbuch", however, suggests
that using both camp TF wagons and field TF wagons could be allowed.
At the moment six "feudal or clerical" WWg (O) are allowed after
1426. This may not be enough; it certainly wouldn't be enough for
the 1,000, or even 350, allied wagons of Pfeddersheim, at the rules'
suggested scale of 25 war-wagons to an element, if those were to be
treated as WWg. However WWg numbers may be best left for another
proposal.
(For Pfeddersheim, John Laurence Adams, Friedrich the Victorious, (Freezywater 1993).
1425-1476, Count Palatine on the Rhine
Christopher Gravett, German Medieval Armies 1300–1500 (Osprey 1985).)
4 Dismounting knights
The current list allows knights after 1235 to dismount either as Bd
(S), as is normal for Kn at this period, or as Sp (S). This latter
option appears to be based only on the battle of Sempach in 1386. The
traditional story of this battle is that the Austrian Habsburg
knights dismounted with long lances that outreached the Swiss
halberds, and their line was only breached when a Swiss hero, Arnold
von Winkelried, grabbed hold of an armful of these lances and plunged
them into his own breast, creating a breach in the line that his
comrades could exploit.
However it has been demonstrated that this story does not appear in
the contemporary accounts of the battle, but is a later elaboration.
The hero first appears, anonymously, in a late 15th-century edition
of a chronicle – by which time, of course, long pikes were common
infantry weapons - and he is not named as Winkelried until the 16th
century. His name and fame appear to be inspired by a genuine Arnold
von Winkelried who similarly tore a breach in the line of Habsburg
landsknecht pikes at Bicocca in 1522. The key point for our purposes
is that the story of the Austrian knights' long lances only appears
in connection with that of the kamikaze hero, once the hero story is
dismissed there seems to be no reason to believe that of the lances,
since no source remains for it.
(the song including this legend can be found at
http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/yonge/deeds/sempach.html
- this is taken from "A book of Golden Deeds" available through
Guttenberg at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/6489 - it is attributed
to someone who fought at the battle, but there is obviously considerable
doubt as to the truth of that)
Therefore, there is no good reason to allow German knights any
dismounting options other than the normal Bd (S). Simply delete "Sp
(S) or" in line 22 of the notes.
(An anonymous contributor writes:
This conclusion does not follow the evidence provided - the possibility of
longer lances can be retained without the Winkelried myth - eg see the
reference below which does exactly that.
The original author responds that this approach ignores the inconvenient
fact that the long lances only appear when associated with the mythical
Winkelried, and suggesting that they had an earlier independent existence
is pure speculation.)
References:
Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages
(Methuen 1924, reprint Greenhill 1991) - v.2 p.249 for Winkelried
as "mythical", though still apparently accepting the long lances.
http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Arnold_von_Winkelried
